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Abstract
This editorial provides an introduction to and overview of the thematic issue on “Aid Impact and Effectiveness”. The guest
editors put the specific contributions of the nine articles in perspective referring to the wider literature on foreign aid and
its allocation, impact, and efficiency, as well as the political and economic processes in which aid operates. They discuss
the historical and present-day context for foreign aid and provide summaries of the individual articles, highlighting policy
implications and future research needs.
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1. Introduction and Overview
The questions of whether aid has impact and is effective
have been the subject of a considerable literature, includ-
ing attention to the aggregate impact of aid on growth
across countries (Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2010, 2015, 2016;
Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Easterly, 2003; Hansen & Tarp,
2001; Jones & Tarp, 2016; Juselius, Møller, & Tarp, 2014;
Rajan & Subramanian, 2008). In this thematic issue, we
build upon this literature, paying special attention to
the ways in which aid affects development outcomes,
including—but not limited to—growth. We pay special
attention to work that speaks to aid impact and effec-
tiveness in fragile states and situations, where develop-
ment outcomes have been the poorest and domestic ca-
pacity weakest.
While decreasing in relative terms, foreign aid re-
mains an important financial flow for many developing
countries. The topic of aid’s impact on growth, therefore,
remains central to the development literature. Overall,
a consensus has emerged over the last decade that aid
does seem to promote aggregate growth. At the same
time, estimates of the impact vary and many studies fo-
cus on different factors that diminish aid’s potential im-
pact. In their study, Mekasha and Tarp (2019) turn to
meta-analysis to provide an overall assessment, building
on previous work (Mekasha & Tarp, 2013). They are care-
ful to point out the potential weaknesses of this method-
ology as applied to the impact of foreign aid. That said,
their new and updated results confirm the increasing
consensus about the positive evidence of aid’s impact on
growth. They also show that this result is robust to includ-
ing more recent studies and for different time horizons.
In turn,Martínez-Zarzoso (2019) considers the impact
of aid on recipient income through international trade.
She applies a structural gravity model of trade where aid
is included, and estimates a set of trade variables for
a cross-section of 33 donor countries and 125 recipient
countries over the period 1995 to 2016. She furthermore
uses a control function approach and instrumental vari-
able techniques to estimate the indirect effect of aid on
income. Her results are in line with emerging consensus
about aid’s impact on recipient income, highlighting that
effects are heterogeneous and vary by region.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 1–4 1
Aid is provided formany reasons and to achievemany
objectives. Promoting growth and income is only one
dimension. Attention to the provision of basic needs
has been a recurring theme in development debates for
decades. Many have argued that satisfying basic needs
is a precondition for broad-based growth. See for exam-
ple the famous quote by the architect of the Human De-
velopment Reports, Professor Mahbub ul Haq: “We were
taught to take care of our GNP as this will take care of
poverty. Let us reverse this and take care of poverty first
as the GNP can take care of itself” (Haq, 2018). For sure,
from 1995 onwards, attention to the provision of health
and educationwas central to theMilleniumDevelopment
Goal agenda. As Banchani and Swiss (2019) note, the G8
placed in 2010 renewed focus on maternal health via the
Muskoka Initiative, with increased commitment to sup-
port aid interventions in this area, and the Sustainable
Development Goals similarly prioritize maternal health.
These authors take as their starting point that there is
little analytical evidence on the impact of foreign aid on
maternal mortality in developing countries. They analyse
aid’s impact on maternal health in a sample of 130 low-
and middle-income countries from 1996 to 2015. Results
show limited effects of total aid, but significant reduc-
tions in maternal mortality related to aid allocated to the
reproductive health sector. The policy implication is that
targeting aid to specific sectors has significant potential.
Climate change has over the last two decades pushed
itself into a central position in international development
and discussions about the future of the globe. In parallel,
climate related aid is on the rise (see Arndt & Tarp, 2014).
It is therefore natural to ask, as Kono and Montinola
(2019) do, what the relationship is between climate aid
and recipient climate policy. They find no evidence that
the former is systematically related to the latter. They
also qualify their conclusion with reference to the poor
quality of both climate aid and climate policy data. It
is well established in the literature that great care has
to be exercised in avoiding to overextend the use of in-
significant statistical parameters in aid debates. To be
sure, an insignificant parameter reflects our lack of evi-
dence. Temple (2010) spells this out in the following way:
“An insignificant coefficient should usually be seen as ab-
sence of evidence, not evidence of absence, at least until
the economic implications of a confidence interval have
been explored.” (p. 4448). Kono and Montinola (2019)
conclude by specifying what is required in the climate
change area to arrive at firm conclusions.
Aid is regularly justified with reference to the needs
of recipient countries. The group of fragile and conflict-
affected states is therefore a clear priority. Carment and
Samy (2019) ask whether aid to this group is targeted
to where it is most needed. Using the Country Indica-
tors for Foreign Policy (CIFP) fragility index, together with
data on aid flows from the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development’s Creditor Reporting Sys-
tem and six country cases, they extend recent and forth-
coming work (Carment & Samy, 2017, forthcoming). Con-
sidering the types of aid received against the CIFP frame-
work, the authors conclude that aid is poorly targeted
in fragile states. They argue that aid’s impact would be
improved through better targeting to address core chal-
lenges of legitimacy and authority that are important to
understanding why states are fragile.
Domestic ownership of foreign aid programmes is a
longstanding topic in relation to foreign aid (see e.g., Tarp
& Roland-Holst, 2004), and local ownership is set out
as a fundamental principle for aid effectiveness in the
Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action, and Busan
Partnership. Despite the existing rhetoric among both
donor and recipient countries on this issue, Chasukwa
and Banik (2019) find that aid continues to be disbursed
by donors without proper coordination with national in-
stitutional structures. While the early literature on this
topic justified such practice with reference to efficiency,
more recent justifications have shifted to refer to cor-
ruption and weak implementation capacity consistent
with Chasukwa and Banik’s findings. The authors study
this in the context of Malawi and show that that a va-
riety of modalities are used to circumvent national in-
stitutions. The implication is fragmentation of aid and
lack of coordination that leads to lower potential impact
than would otherwise be possible (see also Bigsten &
Tengstam, 2015).
Winters (2019) pursues a parallel topic addressing
the question of the number of funding streams involved
in World Bank projects. He combines data from World
Bank projects with project performance ratings and stud-
ies within country variation across projects to establish
any evidence for reduced aid effectiveness when more
participants are engaged. As such, he points to yet an-
other avenue that limits the potential impact of aid. This
is very much in line with the traditional debates about
the large transactions costs often inherent in providing
aid to countries in need (see Paul & Vandeninden, 2012).
Too many cooks do indeed often lead to less quality.
Aid effectiveness also may be influenced by donor
motivations, and a significant literature on donor mo-
tivations in aid allocation exists. A particular strand is
focused on how aid is used to buy influence through
aid allocation to the Bretton Woods institutions and the
United Nations (see e.g., Andersen, Harr, & Tarp, 2006).
Reinsberg (2019) examines whether multi-bilateral aid
is used to promote countries’ interest in becoming a
temporary member of the UN Security Council (see also
Dreher, Lang, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2018). His analy-
sis draws on new data using media reports to assess
donor interest inwinning seats in theUN security council,
along with data on multi-bilateral aid flows. He demon-
strates that multi-bilateral aid is indeed used for geopo-
litical purposes.
The demand and supply for aid is often couched in
economic terms. At the same time, it is widely under-
stood that development assistance is in many ways a po-
litical project by donor countries (see Lancaster, 2006).
It is also clear that the politics of aid recipient coun-
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tries matter to aid effectiveness. Over the past several
decades, practitioners have sought to improve aid effec-
tiveness by better taking politics into account, with grow-
ing interest and explicit reference to ‘thinking and work-
ing politically’ (TWP) in development (Carothers & de
Gramont, 2013). Dasandi, Laws, Marquette and Robin-
son (2019) speak to the need for more systematic atten-
tion to the the evidence base on TWP and its impact
on aid effectiveness. Although there is not yet a ‘strong
enough’ evidence base, they argue, this is not surprising
given that TWP is relatively recent in development pro-
gramming. They discuss evidence in a variety of areas
and suggest where future research should be focused.
While much remains to be learned about aid, as is
true in other areas of social policy, we argue that fu-
ture progress needs to take account of what is already
known and hope that this thematic issue provides stimu-
lating reading in this regard. At the same time, our ambi-
tion is to inspire further study and research on the need,
supply, and provision of foreign aid and how to improve
aid effectiveness.
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